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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
This immigration case requires us to decide, among 
other things, whether the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause guarantees an alien effective assistance of counsel in 
preparing, filing, and appealing a labor certification 
application and a visa petition before the start of removal 
proceedings.  We hold that it does not, and thus deny the 
petition for review.   
I. Background 
Petitioners Margarito Contreras and his wife Norma, 
both natives and citizens of Mexico, entered the United States 
unlawfully in 1993 and 1998, respectively.  Since 2000, 
Margarito has been seeking employment-based permanent 
residency in the United States, i.e., a “green card.”  This long, 
complex process requires submitting several applications with 
supporting documentation to the United States Department of 
Labor (“DOL”) and the United States Customs and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) of the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”).  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 
F.3d 226, 228 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006); Matter of Rajah, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 127, 130-33 (BIA 2009). 
The process involves three essential steps.  First, an 
alien’s employer files a Form ETA-750 labor certification 
application with the DOL on the alien’s behalf.  The DOL 
will approve the application only if, among other things, there 
are not sufficient United States workers “able, willing, 
qualified . . . and available” to perform the job.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)(I).   
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Second, if the DOL approves the labor certification 
application, the employer files it along with a Form I-140 visa 
petition with the USCIS.  8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(F).  Among 
other things, the employer must prove that it can afford to pay 
the alien the proffered wage from the time it filed the labor 
certification application until the time the alien obtains lawful 
permanent residency.  8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).  If the USCIS 
approves the visa petition, then it determines the alien’s 
preference classification for a visa and assigns the alien a visa 
number.  Employment-based visas are subject to numerical 
restrictions controlled by the State Department.  8 U.S.C. § 
1153(g).   
Third and finally, once a visa is “immediately 
available,” the alien applies for a status adjustment by filing a 
Form I-485 status adjustment application.  8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).  
If that application is approved, then the alien becomes a 
lawful permanent resident and the DHS issues the alien a 
green card. 
An individual like Margarito, who would not 
ordinarily qualify for lawful permanent residency because he 
entered the United States without inspection, may nonetheless 
apply if, among other things, he is the beneficiary of a labor 
certification application or a visa petition filed on or before 
April 30, 2001.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). 
Unfortunately, the Contrerases’ former immigration 
attorney, Tahir Mella (who was not appellate counsel before 
this Court) provided incompetent, and at times ethically 
questionable, representation throughout Margarito’s visa 
petition process.   
In April 2001, Mella prepared a labor certification 
application on behalf of Margarito’s long-time employer, 
Barrels Italian Foods and Restaurant, and filed it with the 
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DOL before the April 30 statutory deadline.  For reasons 
unknown, the agency waited more than five years before 
approving the application in August 2006.  Mella then filed a 
visa petition with the USCIS in January 2007.  Ten months 
after that, in November 2007, the USCIS denied the petition 
because Barrels failed to prove that it could afford to pay 
Margarito the proffered wage.  The USCIS’s written decision, 
which it mailed to Mella’s office, indicated that Barrels could 
appeal the visa petition denial but that any appeal must be 
filed within 33 days.  None was ever filed.  According to 
Mella, he did not file an appeal because Barrels “pulled out” 
in December 2007.  To the contrary, the owner of Barrels 
claims that she has “always been willing to sponsor Margarito 
Contreras.” 
In January 2008, well after the 33-day appeal window 
had closed, Margarito met with Mella to discuss his options.  
Mella told him that for $1,000 he could file a “motion to 
reopen” the visa petition.  Margarito agreed.  At some point, 
however, Mella instead decided to file a motion to reconsider.  
Notably, he neglected to mention to Margarito that the 30-day 
time limit to file a motion to reconsider had also passed, see 8 
C.F.R. § 103.5(a), but Mella accepted the $1,000.  In March 
2008 Mella finally filed an untimely motion to reconsider the 
USCIS’s denial of the visa petition with the DHS, almost four 
months after the USCIS denied the petition and two months 
after Margarito paid him the $1,000.  The outcome of that 
motion (or when it was decided) is not evident from the 
record.    
Shortly after Mella agreed to file a motion to reopen, 
the DHS began removal proceedings against the Contrerases, 
charging them with being present unlawfully in the United 
States.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Mella agreed — for 
another $5,500 — to represent them at the removal 
proceedings.  He delegated that representation, however, to 
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others in his office.  This delegation was, according to the 
Contrerases, contrary to Mella’s agreement to appear 
personally in immigration court. 
To make matters worse, the attorney Mella sent to the 
first removal hearing “might not [have been] fully aware of 
the immigration laws,” as the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) later 
explained charitably.
1
  Counsel acknowledged the denial of 
Margarito’s visa petition and suggested that a timely appeal 
had been filed even though it had not.  After further 
questioning, however, the IJ sensed that even if the 
Contrerases had filed an appeal, it might not have been 
timely.  Thinking her clients had no other options, counsel 
informed the IJ that her clients would be applying for 
voluntary departure.  The IJ thought the Contrerases would be 
“shocked and confused” if she entered an order for voluntary 
departure, so she continued the case for a second time to 
allow counsel to prepare.  The IJ noted that she would 
“probably not” continue the case again unless the DHS agreed 
or the Contrerases could show that a timely appeal of the 
denied employment-based visa petition had been filed. 
At the next (and final) hearing in April 2008, yet 
another attorney from Mella’s firm represented the 
Contrerases.  This new attorney indicated that the sole relief 
sought was voluntary departure, which the IJ granted.  One 
                                              
1
  Among other shortcomings, counsel did not seem to grasp 
basic immigration law concepts.  For example, she did not 
know what a priority date is.  Margarito’s priority date is the 
date the DOL accepted his labor certification application for 
processing:  April 27, 2001.  See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).  
Counsel thought the priority date here was the date Margarito 
entered the United States.   
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day before their period of voluntary departure expired, the 
Contrerases — through their current counsel — filed a motion 
to reopen due to prior ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
IJ denied that motion.
2
 
On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
upheld the IJ’s decision.  The Contrerases argued that prior 
counsel was ineffective for:  (1) filing a labor certification 
application with the DOL despite knowing that Margarito’s 
employer could not pay the offered wage; (2) failing to file a 
timely motion to reconsider the denied visa petition with the 
DHS; (3) misleading the IJ by claiming that an appeal of the 
denied visa petition had been filed with the DHS; and (4) 
failing to request a continuance (rather than voluntary 
departure) so that Margarito’s employer could have filed a 
new labor certification application and visa petition.  The BIA 
concluded that the Contrerases failed to “show that the 
hearing before the [IJ] was unfair or that, due to any alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the course of the 
removal proceedings, they were prevented from reasonably 
presenting their case.”  (Emphasis added.)  The BIA further 
explained that 
[the Contrerases’ primary] arguments of 
ineffective assistance of counsel center on 
[Margarito’s] pursuit of his application for 
adjustment of status by way of an employment-
based visa petition, difficulties over which we 
                                              
2
 The Contrerases claim that the IJ denied their motion to 
reopen “based solely on the condition of her docket.”  Pet’rs’ 
Br. 21.  The record reveals otherwise.  The IJ denied the 
motion, among other reasons, because the Contrerases failed 
to show that their prior counsel was ineffective or that they 
were eligible for adjustment of status. 
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have no jurisdiction.  The alleged ineffective 
assistance involved counsel who represented 
[the Contrerases] before the DHS, counsel who 
had been retained several years before these 
administrative proceeding were initiated . . . . 
(Emphasis in original.)  Finally, the BIA concluded that the 
IJ’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that she 
had not erred in concluding that the Contrerases “did not 
receive ineffective assistance from [their] former attorney 
during the course of the removal proceedings.”   
The Contrerases then filed a timely petition for review.  
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 
1240.15.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
II. Standard of Review 
When, as here, the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision and 
adds analysis of its own, we review both the IJ’s and the 
BIA’s decisions.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 243 (3d Cir. 
2003) (en banc); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  We review the denial of a motion to reopen for 
abuse of discretion and may reverse only if the denial is 
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 
503 F.3d 308, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review de novo 
questions of law, such as whether petitioners’ due process 
rights to the effective assistance of counsel have been 
violated.  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153-54 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
III. Discussion 
  The Contrerases argue that their prior counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance both before and during their removal 
proceedings and that this ineffectiveness warrants reopening 
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the proceedings.  As noted, counsel was allegedly ineffective 
before the removal proceedings for (1) filing a labor 
certification application with the DOL despite knowing that 
Margarito’s employer could not pay the proffered wage and 
(2) failing to file a timely motion to reconsider the denied visa 
petition with the DHS.  The Contrerases also claim that their 
counsel was ineffective during the removal proceedings for 
(1) misleading the IJ by claiming that an appeal of the denied 
visa petition had been filed with the DHS and (2) failing to 
request a continuance (rather than voluntary departure) so that 
Margarito’s employer could have filed a new labor 
certification application and visa petition.  We consider the 
allegations based on pre-proceeding attorney conduct first and 
then turn to the allegations of ineffectiveness during the 
removal proceedings themselves.   
A. Claims of Ineffectiveness Before Removal 
Proceedings 
Because immigration proceedings are civil rather than 
criminal in nature, the Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel does not apply.  Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157 
n.23.  But we have recognized (along with a majority of our 
sister Courts of Appeals) that “[a] claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings is cognizable 
under the Fifth Amendment — i.e., as a violation of that 
amendment’s guarantee of due process.”  Id. at 155; see also 
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 2005); Xu Yong 
Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2001).
3
  To 
                                              
3
  Like our Court, the First, Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have held that the Due Process Clause 
guarantees an alien a right to assistance of counsel that is 
sufficiently effective to prevent removal proceedings from 
being fundamentally unfair.  See Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 
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violate due process, an attorney’s ineffectiveness must be so 
severe as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the 
removal proceeding.  See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155 (“[W]here 
counsel does appear for the [alien], incompetence in some 
situations may make the proceeding  fundamentally unfair 
and give rise to a Fifth Amendment due process objection.”) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Hernandez v. Reno, 238 F.3d 
50, 55 (1st Cir. 2001)).
4
   
                                                                                                     
59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 
101 (2d Cir. 2003); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 723-24 (6th 
Cir. 2003); Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 
2008); Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 
2003); Dakane v. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (11th 
Cir. 2005).  The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have held that 
there is no such constitutional right.  See Afanwi v. Holder, 
526 F.3d 788, 798 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated, & 
remanded by 130 S. Ct. 350 (Mem.) (2009); Rafiyev v. 
Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008).  Panels of the 
Seventh Circuit have issued conflicting decisions on the 
matter.  Compare Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, 
144 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing due process right) with 
Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(denying due process right).  The Fifth Circuit has 
“repeatedly assumed without deciding that an alien’s claim of 
ineffective assistance may implicate due process concerns 
under the Fifth Amendment.”  Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 
165 (5th Cir. 2006). 
       
4
 We have identified three requirements of due process in 
removal proceedings:  “An alien: (1) is entitled to factfinding 
based on a record produced before the decisionmaker and 
disclosed to him or her; (2) must be allowed to make 
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To make out an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim, an alien must show that prior counsel’s deficient 
performance prevented him from reasonably presenting his 
case and caused him “substantial prejudice.”  Fadiga, 488 
F.3d at 155; Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 
2006); Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 
2002).  To evaluate the merits of an ineffectiveness claim, we 
apply the familiar two-part error-and-prejudice test.  Fadiga, 
488 F.3d at 157.  First, we ask whether “competent counsel 
would have acted otherwise.”  Id. (quoting Iavorski v. INS, 
232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2000)).  If so, we ask whether 
counsel’s poor performance prejudiced the alien.  Id.  To 
prove prejudice, an alien must show that there is a 
“reasonable likelihood” that the result of the removal 
proceedings would have been different had the error(s) not 
occurred.  Id. at 159.  This standard “properly requires the 
alien to show not just that he received ineffective assistance 
in his removal proceedings, but that the challenged order of 
removal is fundamentally unfair, because there is a significant 
likelihood that the IJ would not have entered an order of 
removal absent counsel’s errors.”  Id.5 
                                                                                                     
arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to 
an individualized determination of his or her interests.” 
Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 549 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
5
 In addition to these substantive requirements, the BIA has 
three procedural requirements for motions to reopen based on 
ineffectiveness claims (the so-called “Lozada requirements”):  
(1) the alien’s motion must be supported by an “affidavit of 
the allegedly aggrieved [alien] attesting to the relevant facts”; 
(2) “former counsel must be informed of the allegations and 
allowed the opportunity to respond,” and this response should 
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In Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit considered the primary issue we must now 
address:  whether an alien’s right under the Fifth Amendment 
to the effective assistance of counsel during removal 
proceedings extends to pre-proceeding attorney conduct in 
connection with the visa petition process.  547 F.3d 1044, 
1050-51 (9th Cir. 2008).  In that case, the Court 
acknowledged that poor representation during that process 
can result in terrible consequences for an alien and his family.  
Nonetheless, it held that “the Fifth Amendment simply does 
not apply to the preparation and filing of a petition that does 
not relate to the fundamental fairness of an ongoing [removal] 
proceeding.”  Id. at 1051; see also Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 
383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “unfortunate 
immigration-law advice” prior to a removal proceeding does 
not taint the fairness of the removal hearing itself in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th 
Cir. 2005).   
Balam-Chuc, like the Contrerases, sought lawful 
permanent residency under 8 U.S.C.  § 1255(i) .  He argued 
that his attorney failed to file properly his visa petition before 
§ 1255(i)’s April 30, 2001 deadline, and that this failure 
deprived him of due process.  547 F.3d at 1050.  The Court 
                                                                                                     
be submitted with the motion; and (3) “if it is asserted that 
prior counsel’s handling of the case involved a violation of 
ethical or legal responsibilities, the motion should reflect 
whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate 
disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if 
not, why not.”  See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 
639 (BIA 1988).  The Government concedes that the 
Contrerases’ compliance with the Lozada requirements is not 
at issue.  See Gov. Br. 19 n.5.    
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noted that this deficiency did “not relate to the substance of 
an ongoing hearing; in fact, no proceedings had begun at the 
time the alleged attorney misconduct took place.”  Id.  It 
rejected Balam-Chuc’s attempt “to cast . . . an expansive and 
amorphous Fifth Amendment due process right that 
encompasses legal assistance removed from the actual 
[removal] process itself.”  Id. at 1051 (quoting Lara-Torres, 
383 F.3d at 975).   
The Contrerases have offered no authority to the 
contrary, nor have we found any.  They merely claim that the 
BIA “erred as a matter of law when it arbitrarily added an 
additional requirement” not found in its prior decision in 
Lozada or our decision in Fadiga.  Pet’rs’ Br. 19.  Those 
cases, however, did not address alleged ineffectiveness before 
removal proceedings begin. 
The Fifth Amendment right to effective counsel in 
removal proceedings is narrower than the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective counsel in criminal proceedings.  As we 
have recognized, the process that is “due” an individual 
facing removal is the process of a fundamentally fair hearing.  
See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155, 159; Xu Yong Lu, 259 F.3d at 
13; see also Hernandez, 238 F.3d at 55; Castaneda-Suarez, 
993 F.2d at 144.  To be sure, had prior counsel timely 
appealed or sought reconsideration of Margarito’s visa 
petition denial, then the IJ may have been willing, in an 
exercise of her discretion, to continue the removal 
proceedings.  But while counsel’s inept conduct prior to the 
removal proceedings may have resulted poorly for the 
Contrerases, it did not compromise the fundamental fairness 
of the removal proceedings themselves.  The Contrerases 
were still able to present arguments and evidence available to 
them at the time of the proceedings.  Unfortunately, they had 
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no arguments or evidence that would have provided relief 
from removal.
6
   
We cannot end our discussion on this point without 
further comment on Mella’s representation before the start of 
the removal proceedings, even if it is not subject to due 
process scrutiny.  Our review of the administrative record 
reveals instances of not only incompetence but also 
exploitation.  For example, Mella required $1,000 from 
                                              
6
 In limited circumstances, the BIA is authorized to consider 
ineffective assistance claims involving attorney malfeasance 
that occurs outside the context of removal proceedings.  For 
example, in assessing whether an alien has established 
extraordinary circumstances that would excuse the untimely 
filing of an asylum application under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(a)(2)(D), an IJ (and the BIA) are authorized by 
regulation to determine whether the alien’s asylum 
application was untimely due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5)(iii).  Because an alien 
may affirmatively file an application for asylum prior to 
removal proceedings, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(a)(7), 208.2, 
attorney malfeasance for failing to file timely may occur 
before removal proceedings actually begin.  Furthermore, the 
Attorney General has authorized the BIA, as an exercise of its 
discretion to reopen removal proceedings, to consider 
ineffective assistance claims that arise after removal 
proceedings have been completed.  See Matter of Compean, 
25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1-3 (Att’y Gen. 2009).  But the Contrerases 
have not identified any statutory provision, regulation, or case 
law that supports the proposition that an IJ or the BIA is 
similarly required to review an ineffective assistance claim 
that arises in the context of collateral matters, such as the 
denial of a visa petition. 
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Margarito — two weeks’ pay according to his pay stubs at the 
time — to file a motion to reconsider that Mella knew or 
should have known would be untimely.  As noted, when he 
met with the Contrerases in January 2008, both the 33-day 
window to appeal the visa petition and the 30-day window to 
file a motion to reconsider had closed.  With no time left on 
the clock to challenge the visa petition denial, but with the 
Contrerases’ money in hand, Mella sent himself on a fool’s 
errand, what his office readily admits was a “last-ditch 
effort.”   
Furthermore, we are incredulous that Mella promptly 
and effectively discussed with the Contrerases and 
Margarito’s employer the possibility of appealing the denied 
visa petition.  Margarito’s employer’s claims that she has 
“always been willing to sponsor Margarito Contreras.”  But, 
according to a letter from his office, Mella did not appeal the 
visa petition because Margarito’s employer “pulled out” in 
December 2007 and therefore he had “no ability to challenge 
assertions in the denial on appeal.”  Admittedly, only a 
petitioner (Margarito’s employer) may appeal the denial of an 
employment-based visa petition on behalf of the petition’s 
beneficiary (Margarito).  See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) 
(defining an “affected party” as the “person or entity with 
legal standing in a proceeding” and excluding from this 
definition the “beneficiary of a visa petition”); id. at § 
103.3(a)(2)(i) (providing that an “affected party” may appeal 
the denial of a visa petition); id. at § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(A)(1) 
(requiring rejection of an appeal filed by a person not entitled 
to file such an appeal).  But employer support is also 
necessary to file a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider.  
See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1) (allowing only an “affected party” 
to seek reopening or reconsideration of a denied visa 
petition).  The supposed lack of necessary employer support 
that stopped Mella from appealing the visa petition denial in 
December 2007 did not stop him from filing the motion to 
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reconsider in March 2008.  Simply put, Mella’s filing the 
motion belies his excuse for not filing an appeal.          
The Contrerases deserved better.  Mella’s 
representation during the visa petition process fell well short 
of the decency and professionalism we expect from the 
immigration bar.  Navigating the legal complexities and 
administrative quagmires of our immigration system is 
difficult enough even with the benefit of the most zealous 
advocacy.  As this case painfully demonstrates, attorney 
incompetence — whether the result of carelessness or 
dishonesty — can make those difficulties insurmountable.  
Regrettably, however, because counsel’s substandard 
performance occurred before the removal proceedings were 
instituted, we are unable to provide a remedy. 
B. Claims of Ineffectiveness During Removal 
Proceedings 
Turning to the Contrerases’ allegations of their former 
counsel’s deficiency during the removal proceedings 
themselves, we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion 
in finding that they did not receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel.   
First, the record does not show that prior counsel 
attempted to mislead the IJ into believing that an appeal of the 
denied visa petition had been timely filed, or that such an 
attempt caused the Contrerases any prejudice.  At the first 
removal hearing, counsel (whom the IJ found to be woefully 
unfamiliar with the Contrerases’ case) incorrectly stated that a 
timely appeal of the denied visa petition had been filed.  But 
when questioned further about the timing, counsel conceded 
that she had been mistaken.  The IJ was not misled, as her 
decision denying the Contrerases’ motion to reopen noted that 
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counsel was unable to establish that any appeal was timely 
filed.   
Second, competent counsel would not have requested a 
third continuance to file a new labor certification application 
because, based on the IJ’s previous comments, such a request 
would have been futile.  Having already granted two 
continuances, the IJ stated on the record that — absent 
evidence of a timely filed appeal of the visa petition, an 
agreement with the DHS, or some other convincing reason — 
she would not grant a further continuance.  In addition, the IJ 
also observed that she would not likely have granted a 
continuance to allow Margarito the opportunity to file yet 
another labor certification application due to the processing 
times needed for such applications.  Based on these 
statements, prior counsel seems to have acted reasonably 
during the removal proceedings by requesting the only form 
of relief available to the Contrerases at that point — voluntary 
departure. 
Our decision in Khan v. Attorney General also 
suggests that the IJ’s stated reasons for her refusal to grant 
any further continuances were reasonable.  448 F.3d at 233-
36.  If “an alien has failed to submit a visa petition, an IJ’s 
decision to deny the alien’s continuance request is squarely 
within the IJ’s broad discretion, at least absent extraordinary 
circumstances . . . .”  Id. at 234.  An IJ has no obligation to 
grant a continuance that would be essentially “indefinite” if 
there is “only the speculative possibility that at some point in 
the future” the alien’s labor certification application will be 
approved.  Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
  At 
                                              
7
After the Contrerases’ removal proceedings, the BIA decided 
Matter of Rajah, which clarified the factors an IJ should 
consider when determining whether good cause exists to 
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the time of the removal proceedings, the possibility of 
Margarito obtaining an approved visa petition was 
speculative.  His employer had not even submitted a new 
labor certification application.  The speculative possibility 
that the Contrerases might have become eligible for relief 
from removal, especially in light of our decision in Khan, 
further suggests a request for a third continuance would have 
been futile and that competent counsel would not have sought 
such a continuance.   
Finally, contrary to the Contrerases’ suggestion, it is 
not reasonably likely that if prior counsel had requested a 
continuance (rather than voluntary departure), they would 
have been spared the imminent threat of the ten-year bar of 
inadmissibility.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (“An 
alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence) who . . . has been unlawfully present in the United 
States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission 
within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or 
removal from the United States, is inadmissible.”).  Margarito 
and Norma, having entered the United States unlawfully in 
1993 and 1998, respectively, acquired more than one year of 
unlawful presence well before they were even placed in 
removal proceedings.  As discussed above, any motion for a 
continuance appeared futile.  If prior counsel had not 
                                                                                                     
continue removal proceedings to await the deciding of a 
pending employment-based visa petition or labor 
certification.  25 I. & N. Dec. 127 (BIA 2009).  Importantly, 
the BIA held that “pendency of a labor certification 
[application] generally would not be sufficient to grant a 
continuance in the absence of additional persuasive factors, 
such as the demonstrated likelihood of its imminent 
adjudication or DHS support for the motion.”  Id. at 137. 
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requested voluntary departure, then the IJ would likely have 
ordered the Contrerases’ removed involuntarily because they 
did not, and still do not, have an approved visa petition 
making them eligible for relief from removal.  Thus, the 
Contrerases’ unlawful presence for more than one year and 
their ineligibility for any relief, not any ineffectiveness of 
counsel, triggered the impending ten-year bar of 
inadmissibility.    
*    *    *    *    *  
 For these reasons, we deny the petition for review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
